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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

..:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

vs.

:

MELANIE E. POMIKALA,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

Case No. 981249-CA

Priority No. 2

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant, Melanie E. Pomikala, appeals her conviction of falsely making, coding,
or signing a financial transaction card, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-506.1 (Supp. 1995). This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Did the trial court abuse its discretion by ordering restitution to be paid to a
direct victim of defendant's criminal activities?
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
An appellate court will not disturb an order of restitution unless the trial court
exceeded its authority or abused its discretion. State v. Westerman. 945 P.2d 695, 696
(Utah App. 1997) (citing State v. Robinson. 860 P.2d 979, 980 (Utah App. 1993),
cert, denied. 878 P.2d 1154 (Utah 1994); State v. Twitchell. 832 P.2d 866, 868
(Utah App. 1992)). However, where the trial court's order is premised on statutory
interpretation, the appellate court affords the trial court's interpretation no deference and
reviews it for correctness. Id (citing Ward v. Richfield City. 798 P.2d 757, 759
(Utah 1990)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The text of all constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules pertinent to the
resolution of the issues before this Court is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On October 2, 1995, defendant Melanie E. Pomikala was charged by information
with one count of falsely making, coding, or signing a financial transaction card,
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-506.1 (Supp. 1995), or,
in the alternative, one count of theft, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. §§ 76-6-404 (1995) & 76-6-412 (Supp. 1995) (R. 5-6).
On November 17, 1995, defendant pleaded guilty to falsely making, coding, or
signing a financial transaction card, a third degree felony, and the theft charge was
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dismissed (R. 25-31, 32-33, 62).l

At her sentencing hearing on May 16, 1997,

defendant's sentence was stayed and defendant was placed on probation (R. 46-47).
As one condition of probation, defendant was ordered to pay restitution in an amount to
be determined by the department of probation and parole (id.).
In January 1998, defendant orally moved for relief from restitution on the ground
that the victim in this case, a bank, did not qualify as a "victim" under the statutes in effect
at the time of her sentencing (R. 57-58). Following two hearings, the district court entered
an order denying defendant's motion (R. 62-64). This appeal ensued (R. 65).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The underlying facts are not in dispute. From June 24, 1995, to September 11,
1995, defendant falsely made, encoded, or signed a financial transaction card by repeatedly
using her grandmother's First Security Bank automatic teller machine card ("ATM card")
without her grandmother's permission (R. 25-26). Defendant's crime resulted in a loss of
$10,257 to First Security Bank (First Security) (R. 62).
1

Defendant's plea agreement states that she pleaded guilty to falsely making,
coding, or signing a financial transaction card, a third degree felony, in violation of
section 76-6-506.1 (R.25). Moreover, the conduct described therein constitutes an offense
under that section (R. 26). However, the judgment, sentence and commitment form
indicates that she pleaded guilty to forgery, a third degree felony, but does not cite to a
section of the Utah Code (R. 46). On appeal, defendant states that she was convicted of
forgery, a third degree felony, but cites to section 76-6-506.1, the falsely making, coding,
or signing a financial transaction card section. See Aplt. Brief at 1. In any event, because
both the plea agreement and the judgment, sentence and commitment reflect that defendant
pleaded guilty to a third degree felony, and defendant has not challenged her conviction
on the basis of this discrepancy, whether defendant was convicted of falsely making,
coding, or signing a financial transaction card, or convicted of forgery is not outcome
determinative here.
3
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On November 17, 1995, defendant pleaded guilty to falsely making, coding, or
signing a financial transaction card, a third degree felony (R. 25-31, 32-33, 62).
On May 16, 1997, defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term of zero-to-five-years
in the Utah State Prison and ordered to pay a $5000 fine (R. 46-47). However, these
terms were stayed, and defendant was placed on probation (id.). As one condition of
probation, defendant was ordered to pay restitution in an amount to be determined by the
department of probation and parole (id.).
Defendant subsequently requested a further hearing on the issue of restitution,
arguing that recent legislation posed questions concerning the restitution ordered at the
time of defendant's sentencing (R. 57). The court granted defendant's request and held
a hearing on February 20, 1998 (R. 58, 61, 123:1-5). At that hearing, defendant argued
that: (1) the relevant statutory provisions in effect at the time of her sentencing required
that a victim be a "natural person" for purposes of restitution, and (2) a subsequent
amendment to the restitution statute which eliminated the "natural person" language was
not retroactive (R. 123:3). Thus, defendant contended, First Security was not entitled to
restitution from defendant's criminal activities because a bank is not a natural person (id.).
The hearing was then continued to March 6, 1998 (R. 124:1-17). At that hearing,
a representative of First Security testified that although the bank holds catastrophic
insurance with a $1,000,000 deductible, it has no insurance covering loss stemming from
unauthorized use (R. 124:2). Consequently, in situations where there is illegal use of an
4
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ATM card and the customer reports the loss to the bank in a timely manner, the bank
ultimately sustains the loss (id.). As such, First Security suffered a loss of $10,257 as a
result of defendant's criminal activities (id.).
Based on the above evidence, the State argued that First Security was a direct victim
of defendant's criminal acts and was therefore entitled to restitution in full for the loss
suffered as a result of defendant's criminal activities (id.). In response, defendant again
claimed that the bank was not entitled to restitution because it is not a "natural person" as
defined by the relevant statutes (R. 124:5). Additionally, defendant asserted that the bank
could not recover its damages through a criminal proceeding but should instead seek civil
remedies, citing this Court's opinion in State v. Westerman. 945 P.2d 695
(Utah App. 1997) as support (R. 124:3-8).
On March 18,1998, the district court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and order (R. 62-64) (a copy of which is attached hereto as "Addendum A"). In its order,
the court quoted a recent amendment to Utah's restitution statute which defined "victim"
to include "any person whom the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a
result of the defendant's criminal activities." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (l)(e)(i)
(Supp. 1998). Although this statute had an effective date of May 4, 1998, the court
nonetheless applied it to defendant's case and concluded that under this amendment,
First Security was entitled to complete restitution from the losses which occurred as a
result of defendant's criminal activities (R. 63).
5
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering
restitution in this case. Specifically, defendant asserts that (1) because First Security is not
a "natural person," it was not a "victim" as defined by the relevant statutes in effect at the
time of her sentencing, and (2) the district court erred in applying Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-3-201(l)(e)(i) (Supp. 1998) to her case because its effective date was May 4, 1998.
As to defendant's second point, the State agrees that the district court should not have
applied the 1998 version of section 76-3-201 (l)(e)(i) to defendant's case. However, the
State does not agree that First Security was not a "victim" as defined by the statutes in
effect at the time of defendant's sentencing. Accordingly, defendant's conviction is
entitled to affirmance on appeal on the alternative ground that First Security was a
direct victim of defendant's criminal activities, and therefore, was entitled to restitution
under the relevant statutes.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION BY ORDERING RESTITUTION TO BE
PAID TO A DIRECT VICTIM OF DEFENDANTS
CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES.
As an initial matter, the State concedes that the district court erred in applying Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (4)(a)(i) (Supp. 1998) to defendant's case. See Addendum A at 2.
Restitution in this case was ordered at the time of defendant's sentencing, May 16, 1997

6
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(see R. 46-47). Subsequently, on March 16, 1998, the district court entered its findings
of fact, conclusions of law and order denying defendant's motion for relief from
restitution, from which defendant appeals (R. 62-64). However, the 1998 amendment to
section 76-3-20 l(4)(a)(i) did not become effective until almost two months later,
on May 4, 1998. Thus, the district court incorrectly applied the 1998 amended version of
section 76-3-201 (4)(a)(i) to this case.
However, it is well settled that this Court may affirm the district court on any
proper ground. See State v. South. 924 P.2d 354, 357 (Utah 1996). Accordingly, it is
appropriate to examine the district court's ultimate conclusion, that First Security is
entitled to restitution arising as a result of defendant's criminal activities, to determine
whether the district court's order is nonetheless entitled to affirmance on appeal on the
alternative ground that First Security qualified as a victim under the statutes in effect at the
time of defendant's sentencing.
At the time of defendant's sentencing, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (Supp. 1997)
provided, in pertinent part:
(4)(a)(i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity
that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other
sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant
make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this
subsection, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed
to make restitution as part of a plea agreement. For purposes
of restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in Section
77-38-2

7
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fcL (emphasis added). At that time, Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-2 (Supp. 1997) stated:
(9)(a) "Victim of a crime" means any natural person
against whom the charged crime or conduct is alleged to have
been perpetrated or attempted by the defendant or minor
personally, or as a party to the offense or conduct or, in the
discretion of the court, against whom a related crime or act is
alleged to have been perpetrated or attempted . . . .
IdL2
"It is axiomatic that a statute should be given a reasonable and sensible construction
and that the legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result." State v. GAF
Corp.. 760 P.2d 310, 313 (Utah 1988) (citation omitted); accord Perrine v. Kennecott
Mining Corp.. 911 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1996); Epperson v. Utah State Retirement Bd..
949 P.2d 779, 783 (Utah App. 1997). See also West Jordan v. Morrison. 656 P.2d 445,
446 (Utah 1982) (stating that a statute should be interpreted according to its plain language,
unless such a reading is unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in blatant contravention of

2

Section 76-3-201 (4)(a)(i) was subsequently amended to read:
(4)(a)(i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity
that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other
sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the defendant
make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this
subsection, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed
to make restitution as part of a plea agreement. For purposes
of restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in
Subsection (l)(e).

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (4)(a)(i) (Supp. 1998) (emphasis added). Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-3-201 (l)(e) (Supp. 1998) defines "victim" as "any person whom the court determines
has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities."
However, as noted above, this amendment was not effective until May 4, 1998, and
therefore, does not control the result in the present case.
8
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the express purpose of the statute); Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp.. 609 P.2d 934, 936
(Utah 1980) (observing that "statutory enactments are to be so construed as to render all
parts thereof relevant and meaningful, and that interpretations are to be avoided which
render some part of a provision nonsensical or absurd").
In this case, defendant asserts that under the plain language of the above sections,
First Security was not a victim for purposes of restitution because it is not a natural person.
Aplt. Brief at 6-8. Thus, defendant argues, First Security is not entitled to restitution for
losses incurred as a result of defendant's criminal activities. IdL
However, reading the statute literally, as defendant does, compels an absurd result.
For instance, compare the following two scenarios: in the first, a man owns and operates
a local grocery store as a sole proprietor; in the second, the man who owns and operates
the local grocery store decides that it is in his own best interest to incorporate. In both
scenarios, the store is robbed and the perpetrator is apprehended, tried and found guilty.
The State then seeks restitution on behalf of both victims. If, indeed, defendant's assertion
that only natural persons come within the ambit of section 76-3-201, then the former would
fall within the literal, plain meaning of the statutory language, while the latter would not.
Certainly the Utah Legislature did not intend such absurd results.
Instead, applying the plain meaning rule in such a fashion as defendant does distorts
and seriously undermines the legislative intent. Consequently, the more well-reasoned and
sensible construction of the 1997 version of sections 76-3-201 and 77-38-2 leads to the
9
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conclusion that the legislature enacted that version to prevent restitution being paid to
secondary victims, such as insurance companies, while still permitting direct victims to be
able to recover restitution. See State v. Westerman. 945 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah App. 1997)
(insurance company not a victim because "the crime was not perpetrated against the
insurance company personally or as a party"). Moreover, such a construction is in
harmony with the clear purpose of Utah's restitution statute, "that defendants] make
restitution to victims of crime." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (4)(a)(i) (Supp. 1997).
Additionally, defendant argues on appeal that First Security was not a "victim"
because defendant did not "personally" perpetrate a crime against the bank. Aplt. Brief
at 8-ll. 3 Specifically, defendant argues that First Security was not a direct victim of
defendant's criminal activities, but merely "an incidental, contractual party involved in the
matter." Aplt. Brief at 10. However, this argument is wholly without support in the
record. The undisputed evidence before the district court was that although the bank holds
catastrophic insurance with a $1,000,000 deductible, it has no insurance covering loss
stemming from unauthorized use (R. 124:2). Consequently, in situations where there is
illegal use of an ATM card and the customer reports the loss to the bank in a timely
manner, the bank ultimately sustains the loss (id.). As such, First Security was the direct

3

In support of this argument, defendant cites several cases from other jurisdictions.
Aplt. Brief at 9-10. However, this Court has previously found these cases to be
"of limited assistance" because "they involve statutes with language different than Utah's."
Westerman. 945 P.2d at 698. Accordingly, the State will not address these cases.
10
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victim of defendant's crime and suffered a loss of $10,257 as a result of defendant's
criminal activities (id.). Thus, it is patently clear that First Security was, indeed, a direct
victim of defendant's criminal activities.
Lastly, defendant's reliance on Westerman in support of her position is misplaced.
As recently noted by this Court in State v. Stirba. No. 981383, slip op. (Utah App.
December 24, 1998), "the restitution order challenged in Westerman was an order
mandating payment of restitution directly to the victim's insurer." Id. at 9 n.4 (citing
Westerman. 945 P.2d at 696). The Court went on to say that "Westerman has no
application absent an order specifically requiring the defendant pay restitution directly to
an insurance company." H (citing State v. Haga. 954 P.2d 1284, 1289 (Utah App.
1998)). In contrast to Westerman. the restitution order in the present case was to be paid
to a direct victim of defendant's criminal activities, not to a secondary victim, such as an
insurance company. See idL Accordingly, as in Stirba, the holding in Westerman has no
application here.
CONCLUSION
Although the district court erred in applying the 1998 amended version of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (4)(a)(i) to defendant's case, the court nonetheless reached the
correct conclusion that First Security is entitled to restitution for losses incurred as a result
of defendant's criminal activities. Accordingly, the State respectfully requests that this

11
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Court affirm the district court's order denying defendant's motion for relief from
restitution.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2 i _ day of January, 1999.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

GORMAN E. PLATE
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee
were mailed by first class mail this 2!L day of January, 1999, to the following:

CATHERINE L. BEGIC
KRISTINE M. ROGERS
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASS'N
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Counsel for Appellant
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDER

Plaintiff

v.
MELANIE E. POMKALA,

CASE NO.

951901919

DATE:

18 MAR. 1998

JUDGE:

PAT B.BRIAN

Defendant.

This matter came before the Court on a Restitution Hearing of Defendant's
Motion for RelieffromRestitution held February 20,1998. The parties were present and
represented by counsel. The Court heard evidence and argument, and hereby makes the following
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On November 17, 1995 Defendant Melanie E. Pomikala, represented by

counsel, entered a guilty plea to forgery, a third degree felony. The charged stemmed from
Defendant's unauthorized repeated use of a First Security Bank automatic teller machine card.
2.

On May 16,1997, Defendant was sentenced for the felony, and, as part of the

terms and conditions of her probation, was ordered to pay restitution at a rate of $100.00 per
month until 10/1/97, and then $400.00 per month beginning 10/1/97 plus 8 percent per annum
interest.
3.

At the Restitution Hearing held February 20,1998, a First Security Bank

representative testified that the Defendant stole $10,257.00 from the bank through the
unauthorized repeated use of a First Security Bank automatic teller machine card.
1
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

"When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary

damages..." this Court "shall order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime....For
purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in subsection 1(e)." Utah Code Ann.
§76-3-201(4)(a)(I) (Supp. 1998).
2.

House Bill 378 amends Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 and clarifies the

definition of victim. Utah Code Ann. §76-3 -201(e)(1) states: '"Victim* means any person whom
the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal
activities."
3. Defendant stole $10,257.00fromFirst Security Bank and the Bank is entitled
to complete restitution of that amount plus interest.
ORDER
Defendant's Motion for RelieffromRestitution is hereby DENIED. All the terms
and conditions of probation as set forth in Defendant's May 16,1997 sentence remain in full
effect.
DATED this

/A

day of

/ ^ ?

rfA

<* (r^

, 1998

BY THE COURT:

PAt B.BRIAN
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this
M
day of _ THICMJLS
1998,
I caused to be mailed,firstclass postage prepaid, a true copy of the foregoing NOTICE to:
KRISTINE W.ROGERS
ATTORNEY AT LAW
LEGAL DEFENDER ASSN
424 EAST 500 SOUTH #300
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
HOWARD R. LEMCKE
ATTORNEY AT LAW
DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
231 EAST 400 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
DATED this

(1

day of

Z\ij^

UhhlWx

tLERK
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